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) 
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Case No. 16897 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This was a personal injury action by plaintiff-
appellant, Lisa Watters, against defendant-respondent Elizabeth 
Hemingway, resulting from an automobile accident. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried in the District Court and the jury 
returned a verdict finding defendant Hemingway negligent. This 
negligence was not found to be a proximate cause of the accident, 
however. Defendant Clayton Querry was found to 100% at fault. 
The jury awarded $115,000 general damages and $38,000 special 
damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the trial court's 
finding that defendant Hemingway's negligence was not a proximate 
cause of the accident. As an alternative, respondent asks for a 
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new trial on the issue of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case arises out of an accident which occurred 
February 26, 1976. The accident occurred at approximately 10:00 
p.m. at 2910 South 7th East, Salt Lake County, Utah. Visibility 
was clear and the road condition was level and dry. 
All of the parties involved in this dispute, respondent 
Hemingway, defendant Querry, and appellant Watters, were driving 
north on 7th East prior to the accident. Respondent Hemingway 
made a left turn from 7th East and subsequently defendant Querry 
struck appellant's car from the rear. 
In view of the respondent's favorable jury verdict, the 
facts will be considered in the light most favorable to her on 
this appeal. On the date of the accident, respondent, Elizabeth 
Hemingway, was 17 years old. Respondent and her brother had been 
engaged in dropping off two of her brother's friends in the 
vicinity of 7th East. Appellant, Lisa Watters, was 36 years old 
at the time of the accident. She was traveling on 7th East 
enroute to her place of work. 
The respondent entered 7th East from Elgin Avenue. She 
turned onto to 7th East proceeding from Elgin Avenue to the lane 
next to the far left lane. She then moved into the left hand 
lane to make a left turn at the end of the island. She carefully 
signaled her lane changes. (TR. p. 201, L. 9-24) The movement 
of respondent's car, as supported by witnesses' testimony, was 
-2-
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gradual and not sudden and unexpected. (TR. p. 88, L. 27-29; 
TR. p. 266, L. 12-19) 
The respondent's vehicle did not come to a complete 
stop. (TR. p. 201, L. 14-19; p. 266, L. 3-11) She merely slowed 
down, waited for a southbound car to pass, and completed her 
turn. The appellant noticed the respondent's car while she was 
still more than 160 yards away. (TR. p. 111, L. 4-5) The 
appellant had a clear view of traffic and observed that respon-
dent was traveling more slowly and had applied her brakes. 
(TR. p. 112, L. 3-23) Appellant attempted to change lanes but 
could not complete the change because of traffic to the right of 
her. (TR. p. 113, L. 18-19) By this time, appellant had moved 
so close to respondent as to necessitate an abrupt, hard stop on 
the part of appellant. (TR. p. 113, L. 20-23) Still, she was 
able to avoid contact with the respondent's car. 
At this time, the vehicle of defendant Querry was pro-
ceeding north in the left lane of traffic. The undisputed facts 
disclose that the defendant Querry, immediately prior to the 
collision with appellant's vehicle, was engaged in conversation 
with a passenger and, therefore, was not maintaining a proper 
lookout. He did not observe the sudden stop of appellant's car. 
(TR. p. 216, L. 8-14, First Trial) 
As respondent completed her turn around the island, 
appellant began to pull away from the position where she had 
stopped. Defendant Querry then collided with appellant's 
vehicle. At this instant, respondent's car had completed her 
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turn and was not a factor in the cause of the accident. The 
respondent pulled her car to the side of the road and asked if 
anyone was hurt. (TR. p. 204, L. 19-24) Someone replied that 
everyone was all right and the respondent proceeded home. (TR. 
p. 205, L. 9-15) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ISSUE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE WAS PROPERLY 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
Respondent Hemingway was found negligent by the jury. 
Yet, after viewing all of the facts, the jury found that this 
negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. It is a 
well-established law, that has been followed in Utah, that causa-
tion is a question for the jury and not a question of law. The 
court has the duty to define the law, but' the jury is the proper 
body to apply the law to the facts of the case. 
Even though proximate cause may at times be a difficult 
question, the question should still be submitted to the jury. It 
is only at those times when reasonable minds could not differ, 
that the question can be decided as a matter of law. 
It has been said to be the general rule 
that what is the proximate cause for an 
injury is ordinarily a question for the 
jury, the court instructing them as to 
what the law requires to constitute it, 
and the jury applying the law to the 
facts. It is not a question of science 
or of legal knowledge. It is to be 
determined as a fact, in view of the cir-
cumstances of fact attending it. 57 
Am.Jur.2d 487. 
-4-
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Negligence alone is not enough to make the negligence 
actionable. The negligence must also be shown to be the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. Utah law has realized that a party may 
be negligent and yet that negligence may not be a proximate cause 
of the accident. In Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 
Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 (1959), the plaintiff's rifle exploded 
while he was hunting. He sued the defendant for negligence in 
manufacturing the gun. The jury found the issues in favor of the 
plaintiff and the defendant appealed from that judgment. The 
defendant claimed that there was no evidence of its negligence 
and that the only reasonable deduction to be drawn from the evi-
dence was that the accident was a result of the plaintiff's own 
negligence. The plaintiff had altered the gun considerably and 
the defendant alleged that this was the proximate cause of the 
accident. The defendant's expert said that the changes made by 
the plaintiff were probably a factor in the accident. The court 
said: 
If it is only 'probable' the jury would 
not be required to find such to be the 
fact; nor should it be so ruled as a 
matter of law, because there is no basis 
for saying the evidence preponderated 
that way. 342 P.2d at 1100. 
The Supreme Court held that the evidence presented a question for 
the jury as to whether the manufacturer was negligent, whether 
that negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries, and 
whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
In the present case, there is only a possibility that 
-s-
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the respondent Hemingway's negligence could be found to be a 
proximate cause of the injury. The jury is not required to find 
that the negligence was a proximate cause and it should not be so 
ruled as a matter of law. 
The majority of Utah cases insist that the issue of 
proximate cause be submitted to the jury. In Jensen v. Dolen, 12 
Utah 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962), the plaintiff and defendant 
were involved in an automobile accident. Plaintiff Jensen was a 
passenger in a car which was struck in the rear by a car operated 
by the defendant. The car in which the plaintiff was a passenger 
had stopped at a stop sign. The defendant, sliding on a patch of 
ice, collided with the stopped vehicle. The defendant moved for 
a directed verdict at the end of the evidence on the grounds that 
there was no showing of negligence on the part of the defendant 
and the ice on the highway was the sole proximate cause of the 
accident. In holding that jury issues were presented as to 
whether the defendant was negligent and as to whether the acci-
dent would have happened in the absence of the negligence, the 
court said: 
Ordinarily, the issue of proximate cause 
is a matter to be submitted to the jury 
for its determination. *** Thus, this 
issue, along with the question of 
negligence, should have been submitted to 
the jury. 367 P.2d at 193. 
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated their position that 
proximate cause was an issue to be decided by the jury in Nyman 
v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961). The plain-
-6-
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tiff was injured when the automobile in which she riding ran into 
~ obstructions on a street in Cedar City. The City was performing 
1 some construction and they had failed to put up any barricades or 
warning signs or lights to warn traffic of the obstructions. The 
court held that the evidence in this case did justify the 
1 l findings that the City was negligent and that the negligence was 
a proximate cause of the accident. In making that decision, the 
~: court said: 
mt 
When the evidence is such that there is 
doubt about whether one of two causes is 
a proximate cause of an injury so that 
the question could reasonably be found 
either one way or the other, the question 
is orie of fact for the court or jury. 
361 P.2d at 1117. 
In Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 
P.2d 287 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court once again held that 
questions of whether the defendant was negligent and whether that 
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident were for the 
* jury. The plaintiff's son was killed when the car in which he 
~ was riding crashed into the rear of defendant's truck which was 
parked with its rear end protruding out on to the highway. As 
the car in which the plaintiff's decedent was riding approached 
the negligently parked truck, it attempted to pass another 
vehicle and when unable to do so, swung back into the right-hand 
lane and collided with the parked truck. The court stated that 
the conduct of a later intervening actor in negligently failing 
to observe a dangerous condition until it is too late to be 
avoided raises a question of fact, to be determined by the jury, 
-7-
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whether the later intervening acts supersedes the negligence of 
the initial actor: 
The second situation involves conduct of 
a later intervening actor who negligently 
failed to observe the dangerous condition 
until it is too late to avoid it. *** 
With respect to the second situation, 
where the second actor fails to see the 
danger in time to avoid it, it is held 
that a jury question exists, based on the 
rationale that it can reasonably be 
anticipated that circumstances may arise 
wherein others may not observe the 
dangerous condition until too late to 
escape it. 263 P.2d at 292. 
Defendant Querry failed to see the danger in time to 
avoid the accident. Under Utah law, this is exactly the 
situation that should be· submitted -to the jury. 
In Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., et al., 
Utah, 16417 (April, 1980), the Utah Supreme Court once again held 
that the evidence was not such that it could be said that 
reasonable minds could not differ and hence a jury issue was 
presented. Mountain Bell was performing service work on 
underground telephone lines and parked one of its vans in the 
intersection. There were signs placed before the van and the van 
had its four-way flashers on, its headlights on, and two strobe 
lights flashing. The plaintiff brought this suit after he was 
injured in an accident with an automobile driven by defendant 
Gonzales who was making a left hand turn at the intersection. 
The trial court awarded summary judgment for defendant Mountain 
Bell, ruling as a matter of law that their negligence was not the 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1e1: 
:o~ 
proximate cause of injuries sustained by the plaintiff. In 
reversing that decision, the court stated: 
We recognize at the outset that in 
appropriate circumstances summary 
judgment may be granted on the issue of 
proximate cause. However, in a situation 
involving independent intervening cause, 
the primary issue is one of the fore-
seeability of the subsequent negligent 
conduct of a third person, and in this 
case, that issue must be resolved by the 
finder of fact. 
In the previous appeal of this case, Watters v. Querry, 
588 P.2d 702 (Utah, 1978), the court also found that there was a 
legitimate question that should be determined by the jury: 
The Supreme 
It appears to us that there is a legiti-
mate question as to whether a jury could 
reasonably find that defendant Hemingway, 
in making the alleged abrupt stop, should 
have foreseen that, in traffic such as 
there was on that highway, some momen-
tarily inattentive driver following her 
would not be able to react and brake 
quick enough to avoid collision with her 
car or the car behind hers. 588 P.2d at 
704. 
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for 
a new trial. The decision did not, as a matter of law, decide 
that defendant Hemingway's negligence was the proximate cause of 
the accident. If the situation presented an obvious question of 
law, the Supreme Court would have decided the matter on the prior 
~ appeal. Instead it decided that the issues presented did raise a 
~ question for the jury and remanded the case for a new trial. 
~ Once the jury has looked at the facts, weighed them, and 
,t~ made their decision, the Supreme Court should not decide the 
_q_ 
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question as a matter of law. In Swartley v. Seattle School Dist. 
No. 1, 421 P.2d 1009 (Wash. 1966), a junior high student died of 
strangulation when some plywood fell on to him while he was in a 
room which he had no permission to enter. In holding that the 
evidence, as to whether the rule requiring permission was a 
safety rule, created a jury question, the court said: 
In the light of all the facts and 
circumstances, whether this was a safe 
manner of storage of plywood and whether 
the deceased was guilty of contributory 
negligence, became questions of fact for 
the jury. Thus, the court could not rule 
on it as a matter of law. 421 P.2d at 
~1012. 
The court also maintained that: 
The negligence of appellant and the 
contributory negligence of the deceased 
was the primary questions for the jury; 
they were questions of fact. Their final 
resolution by the verdict of the jury 
placed them beyond the province of this 
court to determine otherwise. 421 P.2d 
at 1013-1014. 
In the present case, the issues of fact have been pro-
perly resolved by the jury and should not be disturbed by this 
court. 
In Wash-A-Matic, Inc. v. Rupp, 532 P.2d 682 (Utah, 
1975), the plaintiff claimed that there had been a lease contract 
formed and the defendant subsequently would not accept the 
supplies. Plaintiff claimed that this was a breach of the 
contract and that the defendant was liable for damages. The 
trial judge found that there was no binding contract between the 
plaintiff and defendant and that the plaintiff was not entitled 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to any damages. In holding that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish a contract between the plaintiff and defendant, the 
supreme Court said: 
The evidence was sufficient to sustain 
the judgment made, and we should sustain 
the trial court even if we might have 
come to a different decision had we been 
trying the matter. 582 P.2d at 683. 
The Supreme Court of Utah again reiterated their stand 
on appellate review in Fisher v. Taylor, 572 P.2d 393 (Utah, 
1977). The plaintiffs brought the action for breach of a written 
contract for purchase of a clothing business. The purchase 
agreement provided for a down payment and equal monthly 
installments. The defendants took possession but subsequently 
failed to make the equal monthly payments. The plaintiff was to 
pay all taxes prior to the transfer of the corporate stock but 
failed to make these payments. The trial court rendered a 
judgment for the unpaid balance of the purchase price and defen-
dants filed this appeal. The Supreme Court held that the perfor-
mance by defendants was not excused because plaintiff was 
disabiea from performance by her own inaction of not paying the 
taxes. The court, in discussing their duty of review, stated: 
This Court has consistently followed the 
well-recognized standard of appellate 
review which precludes the substitution 
of our judgment for that of the trial 
court on issues of fact, and where its 
findings and judgment are based on 
substantial, competent, admissible evi-
dence we will not disturb them. 572 P.2d 
at 394. 
-11-
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The jury is the correct party to make the conclusions of 
fact after hearing the evidence. The Supreme Court should not 
disturb the findings unless clearly against the weight of 
evidence. In this case, two different juries have made the same 
finding, indicating that that finding is supported by the 
evidence. 
Jury Instruction No. 24, given by the court, was the 
instruction approved by the Supreme Court in the prior appeal of 
this case. The court said that the difficulty with the previous 
instruction given was that it seemed to exculpate defendant 
Hemingway if it was found that defendant Querry was negligent, 
whether or not the latter's conduct was foreseeable. Jury 
Instruction No. 24 (Annex 9) corrects this defect by stating that 
if the actions of Elizqbeth Hemingway were found wrongful and the 
collision of defendant Querry's car with that of appellant 
Watters was "within the natural and continuous sequence of events 
which might reasonably be expected to follow the actions of 
defendant Hemingway," then defendant Hemingway could be found a 
proximate cause of the injury. Appellant now claims that this 
instruction was too difficult to be submitted to a jury, yet the 
instruction is consistent with the law and had been approved for 
the jury in the previous appeal for this particular accident. 
Proximate cause is a jury issue and should only be 
decided as a matter of law when reasonable people could not 
differ. As shown by Utah precedent, proximate cause is almost 
always a jury question. The Supreme Court should not disturb 
-12-
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I 
this finding after it was properly decided by the jury. 
POIN~ II. 
THE NEGLIGENT ACT OF THE LATER ACTOR, 
-DEFENDANT QUERRY, WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
An actor may possibly be negligent and create a poten-
tially dangerous situation, yet the actor is not liable for every 
result which occurs because of his negligence. The initial actor 
is not the proximate cause of an accident if they have created a 
situation which is harmless unless acted upon by a force for which 
they are not responsible. A later actor's conduct can be found 
to be a subsequent intervening act when their conduct makes a 
harmless situation injurious. In the present case, respondent 
Hemingway's conduct did not proximately contribute to the injury. 
Respondent Hemingway had completed her maneuver and appellant 
Watters had stopped. Without defendant Querry's subsequent inter-
vening negligence, his inattentiveness and improper lookout, no 
injury would have resulted. 
In Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 
128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970}, the defendant had negligently parked his 
truck on the highway. The plaintiff was injured when the car in 
which he was riding, due to negligence on the part of the driver, 
collided with the parked truck. While observing that the cement 
truck created a dangerous condition, the Utah Supreme Court 
pointed out that the accident occurred in broad daylight on a 
clear day where there was nothing to obstruct the vision or 
-13-
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distract the attention of the plaintiff's driver before colliding 
with the truck. The court then stated: 
Where one has negligently created a 
dangerous condition ••• if the pre-
viously created dangerous condition is 
such that the later actor, in the exer-
cise of reasonable care, should have 
observed and avoided it, in which instant 
the later act of negligence is an inde-
pendent intervening and therefore sole 
proximate cause. 467 P.2d at 46. 
The Supreme Court held that the negligence of the driver was the 
sole proximate cause of the collision and the plaintiff was 
precluded from recovering from the owner of the truck. 
In McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P.2d 711 
(1959), three large trailer-trucks had stopped along the highway. 
Unit No. 1 had developed difficuties and had stopped to make 
repairs. Unit No. 2, driven by respondent, stopped in front of 
Unit No. 1 and the driver returned to give assistance. Unit No. 3, 
driven by another defendant, parked on the pavement with all of 
its lights on. The appellant approached the situation, and 
observing Unit No. 2 blocking the road, stopped and waited for 
the oncoming traffic to clear. While parked in this position, 
appellant noticed a speeding truck approaching in his rearview 
mirror. The truck collided with the appellant's car. The driver 
of the pickup truck was found negligent as a matter of law and 
settled prior to trial. The trial court returned a judgment in 
favor of the other defendants and the plaintiffs appealed. The 
plaintiff argued that there was error in the instructions given 
to the jury. The jury instruction was as follows: 
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You are instructed that the driver of the 
pickup truck was negligent as a matter of 
law, and if you find that she observed 
the hazards if any of the stopped 
vehicles upon the highway or under the 
circumstances should have observed said 
vehicles, but because of her negligence 
failed to do so in time to avoid said 
accident, then you are instructed that 
the negligence on her part was the sole 
proximate cause of the collision, and 
your verdict must be in favor of the 
defendants and against the plaintiffs, no 
cause of action. 346 P.2d at 712. 
The court maintained that the issue had been rightfully submitted 
to the jury and that the pickup driver's negligence was the sole 
proximate cause of the collision. 
In the present case, exercise of reasonable care on the 
part of defendant Querry would have enabled him to avoid the 
accident. Due to Querry's negligence and inattentiveness, he 
failed to observe the situation as he should have. Therefore, 
his later negligent act became the sole proximate cause of the 
collision. 
It was not probable that defendant Querry would be inat-
tentive and hit appellant Watters' automobile. A person need not 
be responsible for all possible consequences of a negligent act 
"' as illustrated in Stevenson v. Kansas City, 360 P.2d 1 (Kan. 
1961). The plaintiff was injured by a person who attacked and 
beat her while she was going to a restroom in defendant's 
~ building. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's negligence, 
- which was the proximate cause of her injury and damage, consisted 
of the failure to provide and furnish her with a safe place to 
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attend the performance, to provide and maintain proper and suf-
ficient police and guards near the door where the assault 
occurred, and their failure to have ramps sufficiently lighted. 
The court looked at the questions of whether there was any negli-
gence on the part of the defendant and whether that negligence 
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. In holding 
that the negligence of the defendant, if any, was not a proximate 
cause of the injuries, the court said: 
A person is not charged with all possible 
consequences of his negligent acts. He 
is not responsible for a consequence 
which is merely possible according to 
occasional experience, but only for those 
consequences which are probable according 
to ordinary and usual experience. 360 
P.2d at 3-4. 
The court also maintained that: 
Negligence is not the proximate cause of 
an accident unless, under the 
circumstances, the accident was a pro-
bable as well as an actual consequence 
thereof •••• 360 P.2d at 4. 
In the present case, respondent Hemingway should not 
have to guard against every possible consequence of her 
negligence. She should only be responsible for those occurrences 
which are a probable result of her actions. It is not probable 
that a following driver will be so inattentive that he will fail 
to see a dangerous situation ahead of him. 
The negligence of respondent Hemingway was not a proxi-
mate cause of the injury. Two juries have returned this same 
decision. There are other cases where this same conclusion has 
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also been reached. In King v. Ellis, 350 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. 1962), 
a suit was brought for personal injuries resulting from a 
collision of two automobiles, alleged to have been caused by the 
defendant's negligent operation of a third automobile. Defendant 
Ellis was driving the lead vehicle. The second vehicle was being 
driven by the plaintiff. All of the vehicles were being operated 
in the lane next to the center line. The defendant turned to his 
left in front of the plaintiff, made a "U" turn and headed back 
on the other side of the highway. The plaintiff saw the 
defendant, applied her brakes and slowed down or stopped so that 
she did not make contact with the defendant's truck. A car 
following the plaintiff saw the situation and tried to apply his 
brakes but the brake line failed. The subsequent driver settled 
with the plaintiff before trial. At trial, the plaintiff 
testified that the defendant's truck was traveling very slowly 
when she first saw it just a little while before her car was 
struck. She also claimed that she did not see the defendant give 
any signal. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the 
defendant and the plaintiff appealed. The defendant contended 
' that the sole and independent cause of the collision and 
• plaintiff's injuries was the failure of the brakes on the 
;1:. following automobile. He also contended that the neligence on 
the part of the defendant was not the legal and proximate cause 
~ of the collision between the automobiles. Th~ court held that 
the erratic and negligent operation of the defendant's pickup 
I~ 
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truck was not a proximate cause of injuries to a following 
plaintiff motorist who was able to stop and avoid contact with 
the truck but who was injured when the rear end of her automobile 
was struck by the second following automobile whose brake line 
failed when that driver attempted to stop. In making this 
decision, the court stated that if the subsequent driver's brakes 
had not failed, the plaintiff would not have been injured. 
The court stated: 
Without the sudden and unexpected failure 
of the brakes on the Rayburn car in the 
present case, the collision would not 
have occurred. On the record before us 
the brake failure was an efficient, 
intervening cause and the proximate cause 
of the plaintiff's injuries. 359 S.W.2d 
at 689. 
The court, in citing another case with approval, also felt that: 
The negligence of the driver of the third 
or last car was the proximate cause of 
the collision and plaintiff's injuries 
and that the alleged negligence of the 
driver of the first car was too remote to 
be causative in the legal sense. 359 
S.W.2d at 688. 
In Viator v. Gilbert, 206 So.2d 106, (La.App. 1968), the 
suit arose as a result of a four-car collision on a Louisiana 
highway. All the vehicles were proceeding in the same direction. 
The driver of the first car was intoxicated and attempted to make 
a "U" turn in the left lane of the highway at what he erroneously 
thought was a crossing in the neutral ground. His car stalled 
with the rear portion extending into the left lane of traffic. 
The driver of the second automobile brought his car to a gradual 
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stop behind the first car. About 30 or 40 seconds later, the 
second driver was hit in the rear by a car driven by Mr. Gilbert. 
The trial court found that the first driver was negligent but 
that his negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. 
Mr. Gilbert was found negligent and his negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident. Also, a subsequent driver involved in 
the collision was found to be a proximate cause. The trial court 
entered judgment for the plaintiff against certain of the defen-
dants and those defendants appealed. On appeal, the court looked 
at the question of whether the negligence of the first driver was 
a proximate cause of the accident. In making their decision, the 
court stated: 
While there can be no doubt of Mr. 
Wilkinson's negligence, it is undisputed 
that Mr. Provost was able to come to a 
gradual stop behind him and avoid a 
collision, and that all of the impacts 
occurred after this stopping. When the 
lead vehicle makes a sudden stop, or one 
in order to execute an illegal maneuver, 
but the operator of a second vehicle is 
able to bring his car to a stop without a 
collision, the first driver is not liable 
if a third vehicle collides with the 
second.* * * We find, therefore, that the 
jury was correct in concluding that Mr. 
Wilkinson's negligence was not a proxi-
mate cause of the accident. 206 So.2d at 
109. 
In the present case, defendant Hemingway was negligent, 
as decided by the jury, but that negligence was not the proximate 
cause of the injury. The subsequent negligence of defendant 
Querry was an intervening cause and as such, the sole proximate 
cause of the collision. Without defendant Querry's 
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inattentiveness, the collision would not have occurred. 
Defendant Hemingway's negligence was too remote to be causative 
in a legal sense. 
This case has been tried twice before a jury. The same 
conclusion, that defendant Hemingway was negligent but that the 
negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident, was 
reached in both trials. At the second trial, testimony that 
defendant Hemingway had stated that she "felt like she caused an 
accident" was allowed to be admitted into evidence. Yet, with 
the new jury and the admission of the additional evidence, the 
same result was reached. Defendant Hemingway's negLigence was 
not a proximate cause of the accident. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE WAS 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
A new trial should be granted only when it is found that 
there was an error and that the error was prejudicial. 
Appellant claims that her theory of the case was not 
submitted to the jury. These theories were set forth in Jury 
Instructions No. 17 and 17A of appellant's Requested 
Instructions. However, these instructions were effectively given 
by other instructions. The court cannot be said to have failed 
to properly instruct the jury when their Requested Instructions 
were fully covered in other instructions given. Jensen v. 
Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 271 P.2d 838 (1954). 
The appellant's proposed Instruction 17 (Annex 1) is 
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couched in terms of a general verdict. This case was not sub-
mitted on a general verdict theory. The court's instruction to 
the jury, No. 37 (Annex 2), states: 
This case is not submitted to you for the 
rendition of a general verdict as is 
sometimes done, but it is your function 
herein to make findings of fact as to 
special interrogatories or questions 
which are herewith submitted to you. 
It would have been improper to submit this instruction to the 
jury and, therefore, it was properly left out of the submitted 
instructions. 
Appellant's proposed Instruction 17A (Annex 3), along 
with proposed Instruction No. 17, was given to the jury in other 
instructions. Instruction 17 claims three acts of negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff. Those acts were an illegal left turn 
which blocked traffic, an improper lookout and failure to drive 
™ as a reasonable driver would. Instruction 17A merely repeated 
the duty to maintain a proper lookout and to drive reasonably. 
The court's Instruction No. 18 (Annex 4) instructed the jury that 
if they found that the driver had conducted herself in violation 
of the applicable statute, that she would be negligent as a 
~ matter of law. The statute stated that it was unlawful to make a 
~ "U" turn except in designated areas. The jury was given 
- instruction No. 19 (Annex 5), that provided that the law required 
that a person should not turn their vehicle upon a public highway 
unless such movement could be made with reasonable safety. The 
court's Instruction No. 25 (Annex 6) gives the instructions of 
-21-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the duty to maintain a lookout and to drive reasonably as 
requested by the appellant. No. 25A tells the jury that a proper 
lookout must be kept. No. 25B explains that cars must be kept 
under reasonably safe and proper control. The jury could, from 
these instructions, easily decide that if a driver blocked a 
highway and this action was unreasonable, the driver would be 
negligent. There was no instruction given about the duty to 
maintain a constant lookout for following traffic because the 
duty to keep a proper lookout applies to all surrounding traffic, 
not merely to following vehicles. 
The appellant's theory of the case was adequately given 
to the jury. Repetition of these instructions would only have 
erroneously emphasized these points of the case. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
THAT A LATER ACT OF NEGLIGENCE WAS THE 
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
The instructions given to the jury were not incorrect 
statements of the law. Instruction 7D (Annex 7) states: 
By 'proximate' cause is meant that cause 
which in a natural, continuous sequence, 
unbroken by any new cause, produced the 
injury and without which the injury would 
not have occurred. 
The jury should be informed that a subsequent intervening act can 
break the chain of events and thereby relieve the initial negli-
gent actor from any liability. The subsequent intervening act 
then becomes the sole proximate cause. Without this instruction, 
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:t ~ 
the first negligent actor would be unduly held liable for all 
possible consequences resulting from his act. This instruction 
is not erroneous. It is a correct statement of the law. 
Jury Instruction No. 17 (Annex 8) gives further clarifi-
cation to Instruction No. 7D. It does gives a definition of 
efficient cause as the "one that necessarily sets in operation 
the factors that accomplish the injury." It then further 
explains that there can be more than one proximate cause. This 
instruction is necessary and does not add any complications to 
the idea of proximate cause. 
By appellant's own admission, defendant Querry was the 
efficient ~ntervenin~ cause. "Mr. Querry was exactly that--an 
efficient intervening cause." (Appellant's Brief, p. 27) 
Defendant Querry was, by being the efficient intervening cause, 
the one who set in operation the factors that accomplished the 
injury. 
There is no error and confusion created by giving both 
Instruction 17 and 7D. Instruction 7D uses the phrase "unbroken 
by any new cause" and Instruction 17 uses the phrase "unbroken by 
an efficient intervening cause." As explained by the 
instructions, these instructions are correct because an efficient 
cause sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury 
and this would be a new cause. Instruction No. 24 (Annex 9) just 
continues to elaborate on these concepts along with the other 
correct instructions. 
These instructions are the approved instructions for the 
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question of proximate cause. Instructions 17 and 7D are correct 
statements of the law and are approved in JIFU. Instruction 
No. 24 elaborates on these approved instructions. It gives defi-
nitions of proximate cause specifically applicable to this 
accident. 
POINT V. 
COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT WAS ALLOWED TO 
SEE AND TAKE EXCEPTION TO THE COURT'S 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
Counsel for appellant claims that he was not afforded an 
opportunity to see the instructions prior to their submission to 
the jury. Yet, when he excepted to the failure of the court to 
- . 
give some of appellant's instructions, he said: 
The Court has in Chambers stated its 
reasons as being that he would follow the 
instructions given by Judge Snow in the 
previous trial, contrary to my urgency 
that having a second opportunity to try 
the case, that we should make it as much 
better as possible. 
Specifically, Instructions 7 and 17-A are 
plaintiff's proposed instructions dealing 
with their claims of negligence on the 
part of defendant Hemingway. 17 states 
the claims. 17-A defines the defendant's 
instruction, setting out the claim. (TR. 
p. 320, L. 19-29) 
This indicates that there was a discussion in Chambers. 
At that time, it was decided that the instructions that were 
given by Judge Snow would be followed. Mr. King stated that he 
excepted to the failure to give certain instructions and the 
reasons were discussed in Chambers. Then Mr. King points out the 
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~I 
instructions he is talking about are those that purportedly con-
vey the plaintiff's theory of liability. This indicates that the 
discussion in Chambers included a discussion about the issue of 
liability. 
Mr. King brought up the discussion in chambers several 
more times during the course of the trial. He admits there was a 
discussion in chambers. (TR. p. 311, L. 25-30) He claims, in 
his affidavit, that the discussion was only about damages. Yet, 
he said that after working with the court on the instructions, he 
spent a half hour trying to work out a map. (TR. p. 317, L. 3-5) 
If the discussion had been merely about damages, there would have 
been no necessity to work out a map which would have been used to 
convey the liability issues to the jury. 
From these statements, it appears that Mr. King was pre-
sent at a discussion in Chambers and that the discussion focused 
around the instructions to be given to the jury, including those 
on liability, prior to the court instructing the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Proximate cause is, in all but the exceptional cases, an 
issue for the jury. The question was properly submitted to the 
jury to allow them to apply the applicable law to the facts. 
Defendant Querry's negligence was an efficient intervening cause 
and, as such, the sole proximate cause of the collision. The 
appellant's theory of the case was submitted to the jury and the 
instructions were not conflicting. They had been approved and 
were accurate statements of the law. Counsel for appellant was 
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afforded an opportunity to discuss the proposed instructions 
before they were given to the jury. A new trial on the issue of 
liability should not be granted because appellant is disappointed 
in the result of his second attempt to convince a jury that 
defendant Hemingway's negligence was the proximate cause of the 
collision. 
Dated this 26th day of June, 1980. 
F S 
for Defendant-
t Hemingway 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
Respondents' Brief to Samuel King, Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant, 301 Gump & Ayers Building, 2120 South 1300 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102, and to Gary A. Frank, Attorney for 
Respondents Hemingway, 5085 South State Street, Murray, Utah 
84107, this 26th day of June, 1980. 
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APPELLANT'S PROPOSED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
Plaintiff claims that Elizabeth Hemingway was negligent 
because she obstructed a moving lane of traffic. Plaintiff 
claims that this negligence was of three types which are: (1) 
that she attempted an illegal left turn thereby blocking arterial 
traffic; (2) that she kept an improper lookout, so that she 
failed to clear the road as oncoming traffic approached; (3) that 
she failed to drive as a reasonable driver would have and should 
have under the exi~ting circQmstances. 
~ 
If you find that Elizabeth Hemingway was negligent in 
one or more of the above particulars, and if you further find 
that such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, then 
you are to render verdict for plaintiff against Elizabeth 
Hemingway, and award plaintiff damages. If you do not so find, 
~ then you are to enter verdict in favor of Elizabeth Hemingway and 
against plaintiff. 
\ 
\ 
. I 
ANNEX 1 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 37 
This case is not submitted to you for the rendition of a 
general verdict as is sometimes done, but it is your function 
herein to make findings of fact as to special interrogatories or 
questions which are herewith submitted to you. In making your 
findings of fact you should bear in mind that the burden of 
proving any disputed fact rests upon the party claiming that fact 
to be true, and he must prove it by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Before you may answer "yes" to any question submitted 
to you you must find the same to be true by a preponderance of 
the evidence. It requires the agreement of six, (three-fourths), 
of the jurors to answer any question, and at least six of the 
jurors must agree that the answer to the question should be "yes" 
before such answer may be made. 
ANNEX 2 
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APPELLANT'S PROPOSED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17A 
Lookout. It is the duty of a driver to keep a reason-
able lookout for other traffic. If a driver causes a collision, 
which the driver could reasonably have averted due to the 
driver's not keeping a reasonable lookout, such is negligence. 
Reasonable driving. A driver has a duty to drive 
safely, to avoid creating hazards, and to be aware of other 
traffic. If a driver fails to so drive as a reasonable driver 
would under the existing circumstances, such is negligence. 
ANNEX 3 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that a 
driver conducted herself in violation of the following statute 
which is proposed for the safety of-others, such conduct would 
constitute negligence as a matter of law, unless excused as 
explained in the last paragraph below. 
The statute is, in pertinent parts, as follows: 
Whenever a highway has been divided into 
two separate roadways by a dividing 
section, it shall be unlawful to drive 
any vehicle upon any such highway except 
to the right of such dividing section, or 
to drive any vehicle over, upon, or 
across any such dividing section or to 
make any left turn or semicircular or u-
turn on any such divided highway, except 
through a plainly marked opening in such 
dividing section designed and designated 
for such left turn, semicircular or 
U-turn, unless a sign or signs authorized 
and displayed by the state road com-
mission or other governmental agency 
shall otherwise indicate. 
While the above rule is generally true, it is not abso-
lute under all circumstances. It may be overcome by evidence 
showing that under all the surrounding circumstances the conduct 
in question was in conformity with the standard of care a reason-
able and prudent person would have observed under like 
circumstances. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
The law requires that no person shall turn a vehicle 
upon a public highway unless and until such movement can be made 
with reasonable safety. This does not mean, however, that the 
driver of a motor vehicle, before making -a turn, must know that 
there is no possibility of accident. It means that before 
starting to turn a vehicle and while making the turn, the driver 
of the vehicle must use such precaution as would satisfy a 
reasonably prudent person, acting under similar circumstances, 
that the turn could be made safely. 
ANNEX 5 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
It was the duty of the drivers to use reasonable care 
under the circumstances in driving their cars to avoid danger to 
themselves and others and to observe and be aware of the con-
dition of the highway, the traffic thereon, and other existing 
conditions; in that regard, they were obliged to observe due care 
in respect to: 
A. Use reasonable care to keep a lookout for other 
vehicles or other conditions reasonably to be anticipated. 
B. Keep their cars under reasonably safe and proper 
control. 
c. Not to follow another vehicle more closely than is 
reasonable and prudent, having due regard for their own speed, 
the speed of such other vehicle, other traffic upon the highway, 
and all other conditions there existing, and to keep at such a 
distance and maintain such control of their automobiles as is 
reasonable and prudent for the safety of- themselves and others. 
Failure of the drivers to operate their automobiles in 
accordance with the foregoing requirements of the law would 
constitute negligence on their part. 
ANNEX 6 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
The terms "negligence," "contributory negligence," 
"ordinary care," and "proximate cause," as used in these 
instructions, are defined as follows: 
A. "Negligence" means the failure to do what a reason-
ably prudent person would have done under the circumstances of 
the situation, or doing what such person under such existing cir-
cumtances would not have done •. The essence of the fault may lie 
in acting or omitting to act. The duty is dictated and measured 
by the exigencies of the occasion; 
B. "Contributory negligence" means that a person 
injured has proximately contributed to such injury by·his want of 
ordinary care, so that except for such want of ordinary care on 
his part the injury would not have resulted; 
c. "Ordinary care" is that degree of care which a 
reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar 
circumstances. "Ordinary care" implies the exercise of reason-
able diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight as 
under all the circumstances of the particular case would be exer-
cised by a reasonably careful, prudent person; 
D. By "proximate cause" is meant that cause which in a 
natural, continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produced 
the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. 
ANNEX 7 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient inter-
vening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result 
would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause--the one that 
necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the 
injury. 
The law does not necessarily recognize only one proxi-
mate cause of injury, consisting of only one factor, one act, or 
the conduct of only one person. To the contrary, the acts and 
omissions of two or more persons may work concurrently as the 
efficient cause of an injury, and in such a case, each of the 
participating acts or omissions is regarded in law as a proximate 
cause and both may be held responsible. 
ANNEX 8 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
You are instructed that a circumstance or act can 
reasonably be regarded as the effective factor in producing an 
injury and can be properly regarded as a proximate cause of it, 
even though later events which combine to cause the injury may 
also be classified as negligent, so long as the later act is 
something that might reasonably be expected to follow in the 
natural sequence of events. Thus, if you find that the actions 
of Elizabeth Hemmingway were wrongful and that the collision of 
Clayton Querry's car with that of Lisa Watter was within that 
natural and continuous sequence of events which might reasonably 
be expected to follow the actions of Elizabeth Hemmingway, and 
result in the injury to Lisa Watters, then you may find that the 
actions of Elizabeth Hemmingway were a concurring proximate cause 
of the injury even though the later negligent act of Clayton 
Querry cooperated to cause it. 
But, if the actions of Clayton Querry in causing the 
collision were of such character as not reasonably to be expected 
to happen in the natural sequence of events started by the 
actions of Elizabeth Hemmingway, then tne acts of Clayton Querry 
are the independent intervening cause and, therefore, the sole 
proximate cause of the injury. 
ANNEX 9 
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